Public Utilities -- Peculiar Charter Provision Reserving to People of Home Rule City the Exclusive Power to Regulate Public Utility Rates as Denial of Due Process by unknown
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
4-1-1950
Public Utilities -- Peculiar Charter Provision
Reserving to People of Home Rule City the
Exclusive Power to Regulate Public Utility Rates as
Denial of Due Process
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Public Utilities -- Peculiar Charter Provision Reserving to People of Home Rule City the Exclusive Power to Regulate Public Utility Rates as
Denial of Due Process, 4 U. Miami L. Rev. 402 (1950)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol4/iss3/17
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
it was thereby performing a public function regardless whether it was
acting in either a proprietary or a governmental capacity.'1
A strike by the employees of a municipality acting in its proprietary
capacity would have a far less detrimental effect on the public welfare than
strikes by employees of a vital private industry. The holding in the principal
case has a far reaching effect since large numbers of people are now em-
ployed by federal, state and municipal governments.'" While the decision
in the instant case is supported by all previous decisions,'8 a far more satis-
factory result would have been reached if the court had recognized that
the municipality was acting in a corporate capacity and allowed the right
of the defendants to strike.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-PECULIAR CHARTER PROVISION RESERVING
TO PEOPLE OF HOME RULE CITY THE EXCLUSIVE POWER TO REGULATE
PUBLIC UTILITY RATES AS DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
Plaintiff, a taxpayer, brought an action against defendant city, to have
declared void an ordinance governing the operation and rates of defendant
tramway corporation. On dismissal of the action by the trial court, plaintiff
brought error. Held, reversing the judgment, that the ordinance was an
unconstitutional attempt by the city council to grant, extend and to enlarge
franchise privileges and to regulate charges for service by defendant corpora-
tion, contrary to the state constitution 1 and a section of the municipal code 2
adopted pursuant thereto. The council exercised the power given exclusively
to the people of the city to initiate ordinances which grant franchises and
regulate the rates of public utilities using the streets of the city. Berman v.
Denver, 209 P.2d 754 (Colo. 1950).
By statute or constitutional provision the regulation of, and fixing of
rates for, public utilities situated and operated wholly or principally within
a municipality, may be reserved to a municipality or the citizens thereof.Y
11. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building & Construction Trades Council, supra at311.
12. There were approximately six million employees of the federal, state and local
governments in 1947, about one-tenth of the total working population of the nation. See
MANUEL, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, 8 Gov'T. EMP. No. 4 (April 1947); 2 VAND. L, Rv.
441 (1949).
13. See notes 1, 2 and 3 supra.
1. CoLO. CONst. Art. XX, B 4; "No franchise relating to any street, alley or public
place of the said city and county shall be granted except upon the vote of the qualified
taxpaying electors."
2. Berman v. Denver, 209 P.2d 754, 760 (Colo. 1950); "'All power to regulate the
charges for service by public utility corporations is hereby reserved to the people, to be
exercised by them in the manner herein provided for initiating an ordinance.' (Emphasis
added) Denver Municipal Code, 1927, § 280, p. 141."
3. Welsbach Street Lighting Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 101 Kan. 774, 169 Pac. 205
(1917); cf. Houston v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318 (1922); Winchester v. Win-
chester Waterworks Co., 251 U.S. 192 (1920) ; Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 67 Colo. 225, 184 Pac. 604 (1919). But cf. Denver & S.P. Ry. Co. v. Englewood, 62
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However, the federal 4 and state 5 requirements of due process of law nrust
be met, regardless of the constituency of the rate-fixing authority. Such
requirements include notice of the proceeding and an opportunity given to
the person whose rights are being adjudicated to be heard as to the reasonable-
ness of the rates to be fixed.6 It is well settled that the term "person," as
protected by the due process clause of the Federal Constitution, includes
corporations as well as public utilities.7 It follows, therefore, that no public
utility can have its rates fixed unless such basic constitutional limitations are
complied with.
In the instant case, the court upheld the exclusive power of the people
to act as the rate-fixing agency and denied such power to the city council.
However, it appears that the charter provision upon which it based its
decision is in violation of state and federal requirements of due process of
law.8 By the terms of this section of the municipal code, the rates which
public utilities may charge are determined in the same manner as that for
initiating or amending an ordinance. They are determined privately by those
citizens who desire to sponsor the measure, or by representatives of those who
have signed petitions. The rates thus decided upon are written up in a
measure, which is then submitted to the city council, whose duty at this point
is merely ministerial. It has the alternative to adopt the measure without
amendment, or, if it so desires, to refer it to a vote of the citizens at large.
The measure fixing the rates which the public utility may charge, if adopted,
takes the status of law. Nowhere is provision made for an open hearing at
which the public utility can testify in its own behalf regarding the reasonable-
ness of such rates.
It is submitted that a failure so to provide amounts to a violation of
Colo. 229, 161 Pac. 151 (1916), writ of crror dismissed, 248 U.S. 294 (1919) (wherein
the court stated that the authority to surrender the state's or municipality's power to
regulate public utility rates, despite a contract or franchise between a municipality and a
public utility fixing such rates, is not to be implied from a statutory provision that no
license or franchise shall be granted to a utility to operate within the streets or alleys
of a city in any other form or manner than by ordinance passed and published in a pre-
scribed manner) ; St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623, 10 S.W. 197 (1888) ; Bluefield
Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Bluefield, 69 W. Va. 1, 70 S.E. 772 (1911).
4. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1. "No state shall . . . deprive any person of . . .
property without due process of law."
5. CoLO. CONST. Art. II, § 25. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." Subsec. 11. "Due process implies that every individual or
corporation shall have timely notice and reasonable opportunity to defend his rights."
Cited in In re Dolph, 17 Colo. 35, 28 Pac. 470 (1899).
6. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) ; Morgan v. United
States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38
(1936) ; N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Neb. State R.R., 297 U.S. 471 (1936) ; West Ohio Gas
Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63 (1935) ; So. R.R. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933) ;
Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R.R. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287 (1933) (recognizing
rule) ; Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & N. R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913) ; Chi.,
M. & St. P. R.R., v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
7. Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896).
8. See notes 4 and 5, supra.
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due process of law, and that this is no less true where the failure stems from
an ordinance initiated and sponsored by the sovereign people themselves.'
TAXATION-FLORIDA CLASS C INTANGIBLES TAX CONSTRUED
AS A PRIVILEGE EXCISE
Petitioner, a Delaware corporation, sought a peremptory writ of mandamus
ordering the Comptroller to refund a Class C Intangible Personal Property
Tax I which it was required to pay as a condition precedent to recording a mort-
gage. The company had its principal place of business in Florida and owned
real property in Florida, including that covered by the mortgage. The debt
was represented by a note held by a New York insurance corporation, payable
in New York, and secured by the mortgage on Florida real estate. Held, over-
ruling State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gay,2 that the Class C tax is
an excise on the privilege of recording the mortgage rather than an ad valorem
tax, and that neither domicile nor business situs is necessary. The motion for
writ was refused. State ex rel. United States Sugar Corp. v. Gay, Fla. Sup. Ct.,
Dec. 23, 1949.
Recent Supreme Court decisions 3 have somewhat abrogated the effect of
the maxim rnobilia sequuntur personan. 4 Today the courts uniformly uphold
the constitutionality of a state statute taxing intangibles where either a domicile
or a business situs are found within the state.6 And there is apparently sufficient
jurisdiction to tax if the state has afforded protection to or conferred benefits
upon the subject of the tax.? In the Seaboard case, supra, the Florida Supreme
Court construed the Class C tax as imposing an ad valorem levy upon the debt
itself, holding that since there was no domicile or business situs within Florida
there was no jurisdiction to tax.7
In the instant case, the statutes 8 were held to impose an excise on the
privilege of recording the mortgage. 9 No mortgage may be enforced unless this
9. Berman v. Denver, supra, at page 770.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 199.02(3), 199.11(3) (Cum. Supp, 1947).
2. 160 Fla. 445, 35 So2d 403 (1948).
3. State Tax Conm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Curry v. McCanless,
307 U.S. 357 (1939).
4. Movables follow the person.
5. E.g., Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
6. See, e.g., Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, supra at 492; State Tax
Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, supra at 180; Curry v. McCanless, supra at 367.
7. Accord, State ex reL. Tampa Electric Co. v. Gay, 40 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1949).
8. See note I supra.
9. This construction would seem to be preferred despite the designation by the
legislature that the Class C levy is an "Intangible Personal Property" tax. The C tax is
to be paid only once, upon recording, and not annually as are most ad valorem taxes.
Middendorf v. Goodale, 202 Ky. 118, 259 S.W. 59 (1923). But cf. Wheeler v. Weightman,
96 Kan. 50, 149 Pac. 977 (1915). In addition, payment is not compulsory but optional.
Crosland v. Federal Land Bank, 207 Ala. 456, 93 So. 7 (1922), revzd on other grounds,
261 U.S. 374 (1923). Still another construction might have made this a tax on the mortgage
itself. See (1948] ANNUAL SuRvEy or AMRzaIcAN LAw 239 n.57.
